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UNDERLYING THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
FOREWORD: EVALUATING A PROPOSED

CRIMINAL CODE
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ*
A nation's criminal code may be among its most important charters. It reflects the balance struck between liberty and security. It establishes priorities in law enforcement. It manifests the society's level of
compassion for its most downtrodden-both those who perpetrate
crime, and their victims. It sets comparative values on life, liberty,
property, and privacy.
The criminal code does not, of course, exist in a vacuum. It operates through human agencies, such as police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and correctional officials. It functions within an
evershifting political system. It is constrained by constitutional and
other institutional checks.
The enactment of a new criminal code should occasion deep reflection and vigorous debate. Nearly every citizen has a potential stake in
the criminal code. Hardly any American family is untouched by crime,
either as victim or accused. Every American seems to have an opinioninformed or otherwise-about the appropriate responses to crime.
Over the past decade, Congress has attempted to recodify the federal criminal law. "Recodify" is perhaps not the appropriate term, since
there never really has been a systematic codification of federal criminal
law. For two hundred years our federal criminal laws have been en* Professor of Law, Harvard University School of Law.
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acted in helter-skelter fashion, with no effort at achieving consistency.
For the first century and a half this was not of critical importance, for
prosecution of crime was left almost exclusively to the states (few of
which, however, had consistent criminal codes of their own). Over the
past half-century, federal criminal prosecutions have mushroomed.
Organized crime, civil rights violations, anti-war activities, environmental pollution, commercial fraud, political corruption, obscenity, and interstate terrorism have been among recent targets of federal prosecutors.
The United States government is now the most important prosecutor in
this nation, and the federal courthouse the locus of many of our most
important criminal trials.
Yet our federal criminal code remains a relic of our sleepy past. I
will not rehearse the inadequacies here; they have been extensively documented elsewhere.' The need for reform is almost universally recognized. There is considerable debate, however, over the mechanism and
substance of the needed reform, as well as over the criteria for evaluating whether the proposed changes constitute reform or regression.
Let me try to place this important debate into a realistic political
context. It is impossible, in a heterogenous nation such as our own, to
achieve complete agreement on the content of a criminal code. We have
not achieved consensus-nor will we in the foreseeable future-on such
fundamental and divisive issues as capital punishment, exclusionary
rules, wiretapping, immunity, entrapment, length of imprisonment, conspiracy prosectltions, obscenity, drug crimes, judicial discretion, plea
bargaining, increased federal prosecutorial power, crimes of advocacy,
and sexual offenses. Indeed, if "consensus" were to be defined as the
support of a substantial majority, I am afraid such a consensus might
well exist in favor of capital punishment, harsh sentences, vigorous prosecution of drug and obscenity sellers, and the elimination of exclusionary rules. This conservative consensus was reflected in the original
Senate bill, S. 1.2 Most of its important changes favored law enforcement at the expense of civil liberties.
But then, as a result of the masterful leadership of Senator Kennedy and Congressman Drinan, a process of revision began. The result
has been a dramatic shift in direction. The emerging drafts-one from
the Senate committee, the other from the House committee-proposed
changes in existing law primarily in the direction of civil liberties. To be
sure, they did not enact the entire civil liberties agenda of criminal law
reform. Had they attempted to do so, the bill would have no realistic
1 A comprehensive bibliography on the proposed Federal Criminal Code appears at the
end of this symposium. See p. 631 infta.
2 S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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possibility of enactment. But the direction was unmistakable: abolition
of the Smith Act, which makes it a crime to advocate the overthrow of
the government, and of the Logan Act, which makes it a crime for a
private citizen to negotiate with a foreign government; significant constraints on sentencing discretion; increased safeguards for the mentally
ill; enhanced freedom of the press, speech, and assembly; greater clarity
and fair warning in the definitions of crime, and decriminalization of
some victimless crimes.
Political realities would prevent the enactment of a criminal code
that reflected the minority civil liberties view on all controversial issues.
Even when congressional liberals were ascendant during the previous
administration-when Senator Edward Kennedy was chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and Congressman Robert Drinan chaired
the relevant House subcommittee-it would have been impossible to get
more than a dozen Senate votes and a few dozen House votes on the
total abolition of capital punishment, on the curtailment of wiretapping,
and on other civil liberties reforms. The American people simply do not
favor these reforms, and their elected representatives-with few exceptions-will not endanger their electoral ambitions by supporting them.
Probably, enough civil liberties influence remains in Congress to
prevent the enactment of the entire conservative program of criminal
law reform. It is easier to block controversial legislation than to enact it.
But in the context of political reality, any proposed code would necessarily reflect the predominant conservative bent of the Congress and the
country. It might not fulfill the entire conservative agenda of law reform; some compromise would be necessary to prevent liberal blockage.
But one would have expected the major changes from existing law to be
in the direction of tougher law enforcement and fewer safeguards for the
accused.
This is not what happened. The bill that emerged from Senator
Kennedy's and Congressman Drinan's committees were unmistakably in
the direction of increased civil liberties.
In the view of many civil libertarians, including me, the reforms
were not as extensive as we would have liked. Were Congress a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, with no electorate to whom to answer, perhaps the
Code would have imposed considerably greater restrictions on the police, reduced the length of sentences, abolished numerous crimes, added
others, and enacted a more humane and progressive criminal code. But
legislators are not Platonic Guardians; they do have electorates to whom
they answer.
A heated debate commenced within the liberal and civil liberties
communities. Should "we" support a proposed recodification which
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makes some improvements over the existing law, but which does not go
nearly as far in that direction as liberals and civil libertarians would
have preferred? Should we hold out for more reforms? Should we oppose all codification and support specific changes in the existing law?
Should we be satisfied with the existing law until the climate for fundamental liberal reform is more hospitable?
In evaluating the proposed code from a realistic civil liberties perspective, I have proposed the following multitier test.
Is the proposed code-both its substantive changes and its systematic codification-a net gain for civil liberties over the existing
law?
Are there any provisions of the proposed code which are substantially worse than existing law?
Does it contain any civil liberties "horrors"-absolutely repressive provisions?
Does the proposed code contain a substantial number of significant improvements over existing law?
Are we likely to do better by retaining the existing law and
supporting specific improvements on a provision-by-provision basis?
If we defeat this codification, what is the risk that a substitute
codification bill with a far more conservative bent would be enacted over our opposition?
The debate within the civil liberties community has not, for the
most part, focused on these kinds of realpiolitick questions. Instead, it has
revolved around more absolute questions concerning the desirability of
specific provisions, many of which simply reenact existing law.
Similar debates have been ongoing within conservative circles.
These debates, and others, continue today. The proposed criminal code
has still not been enacted. It is not clear whether it will be. Our nation
continues to be governed by an entirely inadequate and anachronistic
criminal code.
This symposium, with its excellent and varied contributions, will
add considerable intelligence and information to the debate. Whatever
the ultimate resolution, we-as a nation-will be better off for having
ventilated these fundamental issues about how we govern ourselves and
how we respond to crime.

